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1. A Reading 
 
The second, and central, section of Rae Armantrout‟s poem “Seconds” reads, on first inspection, like an 
extract from a scientific text: 
 
A moment is everything 
 
one person 
 
(see below) 
 
takes in simultaneously 
 
though some 
 
or much of what 
 
a creature feels 
 
may not reach 
 
conscious awareness 
 
and only a small part 
 
(or none) of this 
 
will be carried forward 
 
to the next instant. (Up to Speed 23-24) 
 
A disquisition on experience in time, this passage immediately raises questions. What happens to that 
part of experience that is not “carried forward” to the next moment? Is it stored subconsciously, or is it 
just lost? How does this relate to conscious knowledge, memory? And, finally, what to make of the 
vocabulary choice here? “[F]eels” suggests definitive sensation – is it possible for a creature to “feel” 
something without being aware of it? Why does this definition of a “moment” relate initially to “one 
person” but then, only a few lines later, to “a creature”? Are the two synonymous? How general and 
applicable is this information? 
  
If this really was a scientific text it would surely move quickly to answer questions, switching swiftly 
from exposition to explanation. As it is, Armantrout frames this middle section with two disparate-
seeming sentences. The first reads: 
 
The point is to see through 
the dying, 
 
who pinch non-existent 
objects from the air 
 
sequentially, 
 
to this season‟s 
laying on of 
withered leaves? (Up to Speed 23) 
 
The final section concludes abruptly: 
 
Any one 
not seconded 
 
burns up in rage. (Up to Speed 24) 
 
Immense complications. To take the first section first, syntax, line- and stanza-breaks lead us through 
an increasingly complex image. First: “[t]he point is to see through / the dying.” So the dying are 
suspect, possibly deceptive, hiding something so that we need to, paradoxically, render them 
transparent in order to see them. This observation is apparently the “point” of some larger process or 
activity, as yet undisclosed. Second: “the dying, // who pinch non-existent / objects from the air.” Is it 
this odd activity that we are being asked to “see through”? The word “pinch” carries connotations of 
robbery or theft, so maybe so. The non-existent aerial objects are particularly easy to “see through” 
being, by definition, invisible, suggesting the tenuous grasp “the dying” have on reality. The poem 
continues though: “the dying, // who pinch non-existent / objects from the air // sequentially.” This is 
jarring. The illogic of the presumably hallucinatory process of pinching the non-existent objects from 
the air in the first place is contrasted with the apparently logical and rational order of their removal. It 
grants this previously suspect-seeming process a new air of reasonableness. Where then should our 
suspicions lie, if anywhere? “[T]o this season‟s / laying on of / withered leaves”?  
  
At this point we are forced to rethink everything we have read so far. We are being asked to take the 
phrase “to see through” more literally than its idiomatic meaning would require in order to see through 
to “this season‟s / laying on of / withered leaves.” Which season is it? Autumn, presumably, when 
leaves fall from trees. “[L]aying on” is a curious way of describing that seasonal event though, 
implying not only a degree of conscious motivation, but also a certain decorative intention: one “lays 
on” a party or a spread for dinner – for the benefit of others and at one‟s own expense. Alternately, 
“laying on” has more religious/mystical overtones – the laying on of hands as a way of healing the sick. 
Either way, “withered leaves” do not seem a particular appetising medium for achieving those ends. 
And what does it mean to be asked to “see through” – beyond? – the human dying to this more general 
natural decay? A reminder that death has its own place in the “sequence” of nature? Something as 
straightforward as that? Perhaps. But isn‟t that rather to overlook the specificity of “the dying” 
themselves, who may be so close to “non-existence” as to seem relatively “see-through” (as well as 
seeing more than is actually there), but who surely shouldn‟t be bypassed for that reason? The whole 
issue is made more problematic by that wrong-footing question-mark at the end. Whereas this sentence 
had previously seemed an authoritative laying down of the law, the apparent „point‟ is now open to 
question. By extension, the whole assumption that what is being described is a situation that could have 
a “point” – i.e. some overarching process, narrative or activity – can now be doubted. What help can 
such preset assumptions be to anyone witnessing those in extremis?  
  
Let‟s turn to the conclusion of the poem: 
 
Any one 
not seconded 
 
burns up in rage. 
 
A different sort of extremis here, that of a duel, in which the “principal” – the one actually fighting – 
has to have a “second” to help him, support him, observe that the duel has been fought fairly, etc. Any 
one not “seconded” in this way would be unable to fight and – especially if the duel were at their 
instigation in the first place –such a figure can be imagined figuratively burning up in rage. However, it 
seems unlikely that Armantrout should choose to end her poem with a general comment on the 
outmoded etiquette of an antiquated practice no-one feels honour-bound to observe any more. In a 
poem so concerned with questions of sequence and order a more direct interpretation suggests itself, 
one that takes the verb “seconded” in a far more literal fashion. Hence “[a]ny one” – i.e. any singularity 
– “not seconded” – i.e. not followed by a “2” (and, by implication, a “3,” a “4,” etc.) – “burns up in 
rage” – i.e. finds its monad status unbearable and consumes itself. This anthropomorphism itself 
suggests a further metaphoric level in which this becomes a comment on an altogether human need for 
sequence and/or progression. 
  
Put the three sections of the poem together and some interesting interactions and reactions can be 
observed. For example, in a poem entitled “Seconds,” not one of the three sections is longer than a 
single sentence. The middle section is distinct not only in its recourse to the language of science but 
also in its organisation as airy single line stanzas. The gaps work against the confident, flowing rhetoric 
of the sentence, breaking it up into smaller and more conflicting pieces. An index to this is the line 
“(see below),” that might refer to the “one” that appears in section three but is more likely an ironic 
gesture beyond the confines of the poem, as though this passage really were an extract quoted from 
some science textbook. The individual‟s “conscious awareness” is what he or she takes forward to “the 
next instant” irrespective of what is lost, missed or ignored. This sense of self, however imperfect, is 
what exists in time, an emphasis on the temporal that echoes the poem‟s title. “Seconds” are, arguably, 
the smallest unit of time that makes sense on a human scale, which we use on an everyday level: if 
something occurs to us in an “instant” or a “moment” we say “it only took a second” or “it was over in 
a second.” Doubtless more occurs in this time than we can perceive or apprehend, consciously or 
unconsciously. This focus on the temporal limits of human perception may explain the shift in this 
passage from “one person” to “a creature” – a reminder that our “conscious awareness” is bound by our 
physical existence, the natural limit of our brains and bodies to sense and perceive.  
  
This chimes in turn with the poem‟s opening section, in which the “natural” decay of autumn is 
apparently offered as a contrast or counterpoint to human death. However, if the underlying statement 
seems to be “we exist in time as animals,” the final reconfiguration of the first section as a question 
addresses how useful or supportive such knowledge is. And yet it seems to tally with the human need 
for order, for “sequence,” even beyond the limits of reason. The image of this is the dying figure still 
pinching non-existent objects from the air even though this activity serves no obvious use. This figure 
appears also as an example of “sequence” itself. The nature of the hallucinatory process seems so 
utterly specific that the couching of this passage in general terms itself becomes suspect, something to 
be “see[n] through”: not all “the dying” after all pinch objects from the air in this fashion. The desire to 
extrapolate a general law from the specific, to somehow generate “the many” from “the one,” echoes 
both the desire to escape the monad state sort-of-depicted in section three and the idea of seeing balm 
in the sequence of natural decay and implied renewal (“can Spring be far behind?”). A hint of the 
specific does seem to creep in, that said, in the detail of “this season” – however abstract the idea of not 
noting which season it actually is, the fact is that this figure is dying, once and for all, at one specific 
time of year, at “one” “moment.” Placing this figure in the “sequence” of a generalised comment is 
perhaps a way for the unspecified observer – also, we must assume, individual, singular – to cope with 
the loss. The final re-framing of this passage as a question highlights the uncertainty of this position, 
the sense that recourse to “the natural” or “the general” may not be enough. The second and third 
sections of the poem appear, in retrospect, like codas to this overwhelming question, deepening its 
effect. The question must be asked, it appears, in order for the individual observer not to “burn[...] up in 
rage.” 
 
 
2. A Reflection 
 
In a 2004 interview Armantrout says “over the last, say, fifteen years, I‟ve started reading as much 
science as I can. I get material or “inspiration” from reading to the limit of my understanding in physics 
or cognitive science” (Chicago Postmodern Poetry). “Seconds” offers an index to much of what I want 
to argue for in this paper concerning Armantrout‟s engagement with science. Firstly, that she is 
interested not only in the “content” of scientific investigation, but also in its “voice,” the tone of 
confidence and authority that characterises scientific discourse. Secondly, that she delights in using this 
“voice” in her poems in juxtaposition with material that might more normally be labelled philosophical, 
sociological or even personal. And thirdly, that despite this incongruity Armantrout‟s use of this “voice” 
is not simply parodic or critical (although it is often both). In a sense, her poems themselves echo and 
replicate the effects of scientific investigation and method. Although its argument is not linear – it 
doesn‟t move clearly from premise to premise, proof to proof – the reader comes away from a poem 
like “Seconds” with the feeling that his or her knowledge has been increased, altered or that, at least, 
his or her assumptions have been questioned. 
 
A favourite Armantrout tactic is the faux-axiom – the declaration that reads or sounds definitive on first 
encounter before gradually (or speedily) unravelling into a multiplicity of possible meaning. The final 
section of “Seconds” that we just looked at is an example of this. Others – taken just from her 2004 
volume Up to Speed – include: 
 
Pattern recognition  
was our first response 
 
to loneliness. (35) 
 
[…] 
 
The opposite  
of nothingness 
 
is direction (40) 
 
[…] 
 
(The whole being 
of the sophisticated person 
is an answer to questions 
not immediately posed.) (43) 
 
[…] 
 
(A thought 
is a wish for relation 
doubling as a boundary.) (30) 
 
[…] 
 
When a dreamer sees she‟s dreaming. 
it causes figments to disperse. (21) 
 
And finally: 
 
The fundamental  
stuff of matter 
 
is the Liar‟s  
Paradox. (48) 
 
Each of these seems designed to trigger first acceptance – surely such a clear, dispassionate, 
authoritative statement, delivered so conclusively, cannot be anything other than true? – and then a sort 
of double take, as complexities start revealing themselves.  
 
Armantrout has said of this tendency in her work that she likes “endings that are like false bottoms, 
statements that at first sound true, but which, almost immediately cause the reader to have second 
thoughts.” She selects a particular example as offering a meta-commentary on the process: 
 
The ending of “The Creation” in Made To Seem exemplifies this while (almost) saying 
something similar. It goes: “To come true, / a thing must come second.” That sounds 
definitive; it has a “truth-effect” while simultaneously undermining the status of truth, 
making it sound like a troublesome little brother. So, anyway: maybe I‟m too busy 
undermining to develop extensive procedures. (Collected Prose 126) 
 
These collapsing axioms can indeed be seen as an “undermining” of the voice of scientific rationality, 
but to regard it only as such would be to ignore Armantrout‟s obvious attraction to this sort of language: 
why return repeatedly to this effect – as the examples just quoted demonstrate – if one‟s intentions are 
purely negative? The answer may be that it depends on how you regard negativity. Armantrout may say 
she is “too busy undermining to develop extensive procedures,” but that “undermining” can itself be 
regarded as a kind of method. The progress of science – if we can believe in such a thing – has been as 
much about the overturning of previously established beliefs as it has been about fresh discoveries, new 
theories and innovative models. The sort of critical intelligence Armantrout brings to bear on 
experience has direct parallels with the rational methodology of science. From a certain angle any 
axiom or premise, however forcibly stated, is a challenge or invitation rather than a fact, what Karl 
Popper calls a “conjecture” – always open to the possibility of refutation. Armed with this quality of 
possible doubt, Armantrout is anything but a simplistic neo-Blakean chastising scientific discourse for 
its allegedly non-humanistic, clinical hubris. 
 
In a poem with the loaded title “As We‟re Told,” the degree to which Armantrout does and does not see 
the “narrative” of rational method as simply “another story” becomes clearer: 
 
At the start, something must be arbitrarily excluded. 
The saline solution. Call it an apple. Call this a test 
or a joke. From now on, apple will mean arbitrary 
choice or “at random.” Any fence maintains the other 
side is “without form.” When we‟re thrown out, it‟s onto 
the lap of our parent. Later, though, Mother puts 
the apple into Snow White‟s hand, 
and then it‟s poison! (Veil 120) 
 
Here the exclusions necessary for a controlled experiment are gently – or perhaps not so gently – 
ridiculed. If the hypothetical situation really requires us to call the saline solution “an apple” then we 
really do seem to have lost the plot and “apple” does deserve to come to mean “arbitrary / choice” 
(although note that, scare-quoted as it is, “at random” suddenly looks less random and altogether more 
knowing, self-conscious and ironic). Another narrative of “the start” involving an apple is alluded to, 
although curiously inverted, in “[w]hen we‟re thrown out, it‟s onto / the lap of our parent,” where “lap” 
already echoes – and is contained within – “apple.” God and Wicked Stepmother then merge in the 
final reference to the story of Snow White. Appearances – and assumptions – can be deceptive: parents 
aren‟t always benevolent to their children and apples aren‟t always a source of sustenance (or even of a 
“fortunate fall”). Do stories help tell us such things or do they merely occlude them? Is this poem “a 
test” or “a joke”? It seems to require the seriousness of one and the humour of the other. The 
seriousness appears to coalesce around the sentence “[a]ny fence maintains the other / side is „without 
form.‟” This is the isolationist thinking behind any exclusion or prejudice, that forgets of course that 
any fence is a negative imposition of form along both of its sides (“Something there is that doesn‟t love 
a wall”). Armantrout‟s target seems to be not so much rational methodology itself – though it can 
appear ridiculously pedantic at times – as the thinking that would see its “bracketings off” as somehow 
advantageous or admirably in themselves. Method – or narrative – is only as good as whoever applies it 
and a methodology, like any inherited convention, is always open to question. 
 
In another poem, with the simultaneously definite yet vague title “It,” Armantrout sets out in 
surprisingly straightforward terms her doubt in faith and her faith in doubt. The first section is entitled 
“The Ark”: 
 How we came to be 
 
this many 
is the subject 
 
of our tale. 
One story 
 
has been told 
in many ways. 
 
In the beginning 
there was just one 
 
woman 
or one language 
 
or one jot 
of matter, 
 
infinitely dense.  
 
It must be so, 
but who can believe it? (The Pretext 43-4) 
 
Who indeed? If the singularity of Eve, or Babel, or the Big Bang, or “Lucy” is not to be believed in the 
face of multiplicity, where does that leave us? “[M]ust” origin be traced back to a single point in this 
way? How useful is to for us to make a “tale” out of it, either way? On the Ark, of course, things 
survived by being herded into twos – is Armantrout suggesting this as a possible counternarrative to 
one-ness? As in “Seconds,” even the movement from one to two is fraught. In the second part of “It,” 
“The Hook,” Armantrout seems to set up an aesthetics (or ethics) of doubt in more personal (or at least 
subjective) terms: 
 
“But what about…?” 
she asks 
 
and stops, 
shrunken 
 
to the impulse 
to formulate 
 
some doubt. 
 
Body a question mark, 
                    soul a wire hook. (The Pretext 43) 
 
“The hook” is that aspect of a subject or thing that makes it interesting, gripping or attractive, the part 
of a song that makes it catchy, a potential hit. In her 1998 memoir True, Armantrout provides an 
autobiographical context for this sort of “impulse”: 
 
“Why?” and “What do you mean?” didn‟t seem to have been allowable questions in my 
home. Now I can‟t stop asking them. (Collected Prose 141) 
 
If this desire to question – a “scientific” desire, I would argue – leads invariably to “shrinkage,” is this 
automatically a reduction? Might it not instead be a purification, a rendering essential? The poem lets 
the negative connotations stand. The final image, or set of images, is particularly suggestive and/or 
problematic. Again, it induces a double take: initially so neat – presented as a simple set of equations – 
its weirdness only unfolds on a more in-depth reflection. In a sense it seems a reversal of the norms of 
mind/body description, body become an abstraction that can only exist as a mark on paper or as an 
intonation in someone‟s voice, while soul is granted all the present corporeality of a “wire hook.” 
Question mark and hook look similar however, almost mirror images. Of course the mind/body 
problem – the ghost in the machine – is a duality that has troubled thinkers from Descartes onwards – a 
duality to set against narratives of singularity perhaps, despite the mention of “soul” evoking the 
Biblical narratives echoed in the first part of the poem. A “hook” itself, in its curved support and 
intimation of violence, seems nothing other than singularity. We – perhaps like the questioner in the 
poem – wish to be let off the hook, but the poem refuses to lift us out of our torn, binary position.  
 
Armantrout‟s critical method refuses then to do the reader‟s work: we too must adopt a similarly 
critical approach. To return briefly to the image of the Ark, we are all, as we‟re told, in the same boat. 
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